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Abstract
We show that if patent protection and trade secrecy generate asymmetric market structure, an
innovator may prefer patent protection than trade secrecy even if the diffusion probability is
higher under the former but it increases market concentration by preventing some imitators.
So, whether an innovator prefers patent protection or trade secrecy depends on the trade-off
between the diffusion probability and market concentration.
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There are two main roles of any patent system: (i) to provide stronger incentive for 
innovation and (ii) to promote diffusion of technical information. Though, the existing 
literature has largely concentrated on the former effect of patent system, the latter role 
of the patent system did not receive much attention. 
The argument regarding knowledge diffusion under patent system presumes that 
all patentable inventions are patented.
1 Recently, Bessen (2005) shows that if the 
innovator has alternative ways, such as trade secrecy, to protect innovation, knowledge 
diffusion cannot be more under patent system than trade secrecy.
2 The intuition behind 
this result is easy to see. If the firm anticipates that knowledge diffusion will be more 
under patent system, it will not apply for patent protection; rather it will prefer trade 
secrecy to protect the technical information. Hence, the argument that patent system 
facilitates knowledge diffusion may be misplaced. 
Though the argument in Bessen (2005) is interesting, it ignores another side of 
the story, viz., the effect of market structure on the decision for patenting. We show that 
if the imitators differ according to their ability to imitate, patent system may increase 
market concentration compared to trade secrecy by preventing entry of some imitators. 
Hence, if there are asymmetric imitators, an innovator may prefer patent protection 
compared to trade secrecy even if the knowledge diffusion is higher under the former. 
So, the trade-off is between the relative strengths of the diffusion probability and market 
concentration. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
We use a model similar to Bessen (2005) with the exception that there are two imitators, 
who differ according to their capability for imitation or ‘inventing around’. Consider an 
industry consisting of three risk-neutral firms where firm I  is an innovating firm and 
other two firms are firm A and firm B. We consider two regimes: one with patent and 
trade secrecy law, and another with trade secrecy only. Firm I  has an invention that 
gives it a temporary monopoly. However, firms A and B can compete for profits with 
firm I  either through imitation or through ‘inventing around’.   
Let us now define the product market profits (i.e., revenue minus total cost) of 
the firms by  M V ,  D V  and  t V  respectively for the situations where only one firm 
produces in the market, two firms produce in the market and all three firms produce in 
the market. We consider symmetric product market profits for the firms under 
competition. We also consider the standard assumption that the profit of a firm reduces 
with higher competition, i.e.,  t D M V V V > > . 
Now, we set out the game. At stage 1, firm I  decides whether or not to patent, if 
patent protection is available. Though patenting typically costs more than trade secrecy 
alone, however, we assume that these costs are the same in order to focus on the effects 
of asymmetric product market competition under patent protection, and under trade 
secrecy only. At stage 2, firms  A and B  simultaneously decide whether to develop a 
substitute invention by ‘inventing around’ or imitation. We assume that the cost of 
imitation or ‘inventing around’ requires an investment c, and this is irrespective of firm 
                                                           
1 See Friedman et al. (1991) for a discussion on this issue. 
2 We refer to Gallini (1992) for the effect of patent and trade secrecy on the incentive for innovation.   1
I ’s choice about patent protection or trade secrecy.
3 These costs are the same for both 
firms  A and B . However,  A and B  differs according to their success probability of 
inventing around. We assume that firm  A (B ) invents successfully with probability 
i
A q   
(
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A q q . At stage 3, productions take place and the profits are 
realized.
4 We solve the game through backward induction. 
Following Bessen (2005), we call 
i
A q  and 
i
B q  as the diffusion probabilities to 




A q q > , which 
implies that firm  A is more capable in developing the substitute invention than firm B , 
and (ii) the diffusion probabilities for both firms  A and B  are higher under patent than 
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A q q q q q q q q − + > − + , i.e., total 
diffusion probability is higher under patent than under trade secrecy only. 
Though, firms  A and B  are capable of doing imitation or ‘inventing around’, 
whether both of them will imitate or ‘invent around’ will depend on the parametric 
configuration, which, in turn, will determine the innovator’s preference for patent 
protection relative to trade secrecy alone. The following analysis will show that, if (1) is 
satisfied, the result of Bessen (2005) will always hold when the market structure is the 
same under patent protection, and under trade secrecy only. But, the result of Bessen 
(2005) may not hold if the market structure differs between patent protection and trade 
secrecy, and therefore, both the diffusion probability and the market structure are 
important for the choice between patent protection and trade secrecy. 
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B X X c X < < , firm  I  may prefer patent protection than 
trade secrecy even if, in equilibrium, the total diffusion probability is higher under 
patent protection than under trade secrecy only. 
Proof: Under patent protection, at the stage 2 of the game, firm  A imitates but firm B 




A X c V q > > , whereas firm B imitates but 




B X c V q > > . On the other hand, under trade 
secrecy only, both firms  A and B  would imitate the technology of firm I  provided 
S













. Hence, if 
                                                           
3 In general, the cost of imitation or ‘inventing around’ may vary depending on the innovator’s choice 
about patent protection and trade secrecy. However, it will be easy to understand from our analysis that if 
the cost of imitation is lower under trade secrecy, it will strengthen our result. The same cost of imitation 
or ‘inventing around’ irrespective of patent protection or trade secrecy can be justified if we view these 
costs as the opportunity costs of imitation or ‘inventing around’ and the symmetry helps us to show the 
effects of asymmetric market structure for our analysis. 
4 Note that, in our general formulation, we do not model the production market competition explicitly. 
That is, we do not assume whether the firms compete like Bertrand oligopolists (with differentiated 
products) or Cournot oligopolists. Instead, we do our analysis with the reduced form profit functions 







B X X c X < < , both firms  A and B  imitate under trade secrecy only, 
whereas only firm  A imitates under patent protection. Therefore, in equilibrium, the 
total diffusion probabilities under patent and under trade secrecy only are respectively 
P








A q q q q − + , and the net profits of firm I  under patent protection and under 
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We find that (2) is greater than (3) provided 














A t D q q q q q V V q q V V .          (4) 
Since  t D M V V V > > , (4) may hold even if, in equilibrium, the total diffusion probability 










A q q q q q − + > .                        Q.E.D. 
 
  The following example shows that there are probabilities and the profit 
functions such that Proposition 1 holds. This example also shows that when Proposition 
1 holds, the total diffusion probability under patent protection may also be greater than 
that of under trade secrecy. Suppose, the inverse market demand function is  Q p − =10 , 
where  Q is the industry output and  p is the price. Assume that the marginal cost of 
production for each firm is 4. Consider  1 =
P















B q . These 




A q q > , where  P S i , = , and condition (1). Assume that, in 
case of competition in the product market, the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists. 
Straightforward calculation shows that  9 = M V ,  4 = D V  and 
4
9
= t V  under the above 
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B X X X . 
We also find that the condition (4) holds with these parameter values, since the left hand 
side of the inequality (4) is 
200
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> > c , Proposition 1 holds and 
the firm I  prefers patenting than trade secrecy. Note that, in this situation, the 
equilibrium probability of diffusion under patenting is 1, whereas the total probability 
of diffusion under ‘trade secrecy only’ is  1
50
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A q q q q . Hence, in contrast 
to Bessen (2005), the above example shows that the innovator (firm 1) prefers patent 
protection than trade secrecy only even if, in equilibrium, the probability of diffusion is 
higher under the former. The reason for this difference between our result and Bessen 
(2005) is easy to understand. Though, total diffusion probability is higher under patent 
protection, patent protection prevents imitation by the relatively less capable imitator 
(firm  B ). Hence, patent protection increases market concentration, and increases 
product market profit of the innovator, firm I . So, if the effect of market concentration 
under patent protection is stronger than the effect of higher diffusion probability under 
patent system, the innovator is better off under patent system than trade secrecy.
5 
                                                           
5 It is clear that if patenting is marginally more costly than trade secrecy only, the above result holds 
good.   3
It is worth mentioning that, in Bessen (2005), patenting may be preferred than 
trade secrecy even with potentially high diffusion probability under the former than the 
latter (see the lower part of region A in Bessen, 2005). However, for those parametric 
configurations, the equilibrium diffusion probability under patent is lower than the 
alternative diffusion probability under trade secrecy, since here imitation is not a 
credible threat (and therefore, does not occur) under patent protection. In contrast, we 
show that the innovator prefers patent protection even if the equilibrium diffusion 
probability under patenting is higher than the alternative diffusion probability under 
trade secrecy only. 
It should be noted that the if the cost of imitation or ‘inventing around’ is lower 
under trade secrecy than under patent protection, it makes it more likely that only firm 
A does ‘inventing around’ under patent protection while both firms  A and B  do 
imitation under trade secrecy, which strengthens our results by relaxing the condition 
that c needs to be between 
P




B X X . 
Proposition 1 has considered the situation where asymmetric market structure 




P X X c B < , both firms  A and B  do ‘inventing around’ or imitation under patent 
system and trade secrecy only. Hence, the net profits of firm I  under patent protection 







































I V q q V q q q q V q q ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 2 ( − − + − + + = π .          (6)  
Straightforward comparison of (5) and (6) gives the following proposition 
immediately. 
 




B X X c < , the innovator prefers trade secrecy than patent 
protection. 
 
Note that when the imitation cost is low, both firms decide to imitate the product 
irrespective of the regime chosen by the innovator. Hence, the market structure before 
the outcome of imitation
6 is the same under patent protection and under trade secrecy 
only. Therefore, if the market structure is similar under patent protection and trade 
secrecy only, the innovator prefers trade secrecy, since the total diffusion probability is 
higher under patent protection than trade secrecy only.
7  
  Thus, the above results extend and complement Bessen (2005) for the case of 
multiple and asymmetric imitators. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Bessen (2005) shows that if imitation occurs under patent protection, an innovator seeks 
patent protection if the diffusion probability is lower under patent protection than trade 
                                                           
6 Note that, since imitation is probabilistic, even if both firms imitate irrespective of the regime chosen by 
the innovator, the market structure ex-post imitation may be different under different regimes.   
7 The other case where only firm  A does imitation or ‘inventing around’ under patent protection and 
trade secrecy only follows immediately from Bessen (2005), and the innovator prefers trade secrecy in 
this situation if the diffusion probability is higher under patent protection than trade secrecy only. 
   4
secrecy. Hence, in equilibrium, patent protection cannot generate higher knowledge 
diffusion when the innovator has the alternative strategy of trade secrecy. 
  The above argument ignores the effect of market structure. We show that if 
patent protection and trade secrecy generate asymmetric market structure, an innovator 
may prefer patent protection than trade secrecy if patent protection prevents some 
imitators to invent around and compete in the product market, thus increasing product 
market concentration under patenting than trade secrecy only. We show that the 
innovator prefers patenting than trade secrecy, even if, in equilibrium, the diffusion 
probability under patenting is higher than the alternative diffusion probability under 
trade secrecy. Therefore, whether an innovator prefers patent protection or trade secrecy 
depends on the trade-off between the diffusion probability and market concentration.  
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